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Abstract: In a frictionless milieu retentions should have no impact on investment 
behavior. However, empirical studies typically find that retentions are an important 
determinant of investment. Managerial discretion and financial constraints are two 
alternative explanations that have been suggested. This paper uses a panel of listed 
Scandinavian  firms  to  examine  the  importance  of  retentions  as  a  determinant  of 
investment.  Measures  of  Tobin’s  Q,  marginal  q  and  sales  accelerator  are  used  to 
control  for  investment  opportunities.  Scandinavian  firms  are  found  to  depend  on 
retentions to a high degree, more so than in other developed economies. This high 
dependence on retentions suggests that the Scandinavian capital markets are suffering 
from allocational inefficiencies. Moreover, these market frictions appear too large to 
per se be caused by information asymmetries or managerial discretion phenomena. 
Possible institutional explanations are suggested.  
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1  Introduction 
 
Conventional investment theory holds that investment expanded up to the point where 
expected marginal return on capital equates with the opportunity cost of capital. In 
line with this the Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1961) theorems hold that the value of a 
firm and investment decisions should be autonomous from its financial structure. This 
in turn implies that the cost of capital and the return on investment should be the same 
independently if the investment is funded by equity, debt or retained earnings. Thus, 
in  the  absence  of  market  frictions,  internally  generated  funds  are  perfectly 
substitutable with external capital.  
However, starting with Kuh and Meyer (1957), a large number of empirical 
studies show that the source of financial funding is not irrelevant for the investment 
decision.  These  studies  typically  find  that  liquidity  and  retentions  are  important 
determinant  of  investment,  thus  frictions  matter.  A  positive  relationship  between 
investment  and  liquidity  is  inconsistent  with  neoclassical  predictions,  such  as  the 
Modigliani and Miller theorems.
1 There are, in principle, two possible explanations 
for  a  positive  relationship  between  investment  and  liquidity:  financial 
constraints/hierarchy  caused  by  asymmetric  information  or  managerial  discretion 
caused  by  agency  problems.  Asymmetric  information  between  management  and 
investors may make firms financially constrained by making external funds costlier 
than internally generated funds. This creates a so-called hierarchy of finance, which 
may  lead  to  under-investment  (Myers  and  Majluf,  1984,  and  Stiglitz  and  Weiss, 
1981). From a managerial perspective, on the other hand, internally generated “free 
cash  flow”  has  the  advantage  that  monitoring  by  the  providers  of  capital  can  be 
avoided and external capital may not be as available (Jensen, 1986). Agency conflicts 
between management and investors may lead to over-investment if managers prefer 
empire building to shareholder value maximization (Grabowski and Mueller, 1972).        
A  problem  with  empirical  studies  of  investment  behavior  is  how  to 
differentiate  between  managerial  discretion  (principal-agent  problems)  and 
                                                 
1 Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1961) show that under certain assumptions firm value is independent 
from capital structure and by the same token investments should be independent from dividend policy 
or access to external capital. However, introducing market frictions these propositions do not hold. 
Costs  associated  with  bankruptcies  and  tax  policies  are  example  of  factors  that  violate  these 
assumptions.        3 
asymmetric information explanations. To be able to do so it is necessary to control for 
investment opportunities, i.e. differentiate between firms that are investing at returns 
above or below their cost of capital. Mueller and Reardon (1993) have developed a 
method to measure marginal q, qm, which precisely measure the return on investment, 
i, relative to the cost of capital, r, (qm = i/r). This method to estimate marginal q is 
used  in  this  paper  to  discriminate  between  firms  that  over-  and  under-invest, 
respectively. If marginal q > 1 firms are under-investing and conversely if marginal q 
< 1 firms are over-investing. Kathuria and Mueller (1995) and Gugler et al. (2004) use 
this  approach  to  differentiate  between  managerial  discretion  and  asymmetric 
information explanations.   
This paper adds to the literature primarily by applying the Gugler et al. (2004) 
methodology to a panel of 292 Scandinavian firms for the period 1998-2005. The 
main  finding  is  that  the  investments  of  Scandinavian  firms,  as  compared  to  other 
countries, are much more sensitive to liquidity. Investments are found to be nearly 
strictly proportional to retentions. The results imply that Scandinavian countries have 
institutionally induced market frictions that are more severe than elsewhere. These 
frictions  seem  too  large,  compared  to  other  countries,  to  per  se  be  attributed  to 
asymmetric  information  and  managerial  discretion.  Instead,  further  research  is 
necessary  in  order  to  detect  the  institutional  determinants  of  these  frictions,  i.e. 
institutionally induced transaction costs.  
Apart  from  marginal  q,  conventional  measures  of  Tobin’s  Q  and  sales 
accelerators  are  also  used  in  the  investment  equations  in  order  to  control  for 
investment opportunities. When it comes to liquidity the literature contains a number 
of different measures and definitions.  
In principle, liquidity can be defined in two ways; a pre-dividend definition 
and a post-dividend definition. The first alternative is to define liquidity as after tax 
profits  plus  depreciation.  In  the  second  alternative,  definition  dividends  are  also 
subtracted. There are also a number of terms used to denote liquidity. Both definitions 
are sometimes referred to as cash flow, which is misleading (considering that both 
changes in debt and equity affect the cash flow). Free cash flow is a more appropriate 
term for the pre-dividend definition of liquidity, and retained earnings (RE) is a more 
appropriate term for the post-dividend definition of liquidity. From an empirical point   4 
of view, the choice between the two definitions of liquidity is of minor importance 
due to very high correlation. In this paper retained earnings is used.  
This  paper  is  organized  in  five  sections.  In  the  following  section  relevant 
theories  and  empirical  research  on  the  relationship  between  investments,  agency 
problems and asymmetric information are reviewed. The marginal q methodology and 
data  are  presented  in  section  three.  Section  four  contains  empirical  findings  and 
analysis. Policy implications and conclusions are discussed in section five.    
 
 
2  Investments, agency problems and asymmetric information 
 
Neoclassical investment theory predicts that investments are made up to a point where 
the  expected  marginal  rate  of  return  on  capital  equates  with  the  cost  of  capital 
(Jorgenson, 1963). Investments that fulfill this criterion are said to be efficient. In 
empirical studies of investment behavior the crucial problem is how to control for 
unobserved  expectations  of  future  investment  opportunities.  Brainard  and  Tobin 
(1968)  and  Tobin  (1969)  developed  a  solution  to  this  problem:  Q-theory  of 
investment. The Q-theory of investment has the advantage of providing information 
about  future  market  conditions  of  importance  for  investments,  without  detailed 
knowledge or assumptions of future demand and supply conditions.  
In the neoclassical Q-theory of investment
2 the investment expenditure of a 
firm is determined by its Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of the 
firm divided by the replacement cost of capital ( t t t a K M Q / , = ). This quotient gives 
the average return on capital relative its opportunity cost of capital. Assuming that 
Tobin’s Q controls for investment opportunities of a firm, Hubbard (1998) derives the 











                                                    (1) 
 
                                                 
2 The Q-theory is sometimes referred to as the modified neoclassical theory. This refers to the fact that 
neoclassical theory is, as compared to the Q-theory, not forward looking.    5 
where It and Kt-1 are investment and capital in period t and t-1, respectively, and a is 
the replacement investment coefficient. This basic specification is found in a large 
number of empirical studies.   
However, if we are concerned about the adjustment of the capital stock, Kt, the 
marginal return on capital is more relevant. The marginal return on capital gives the 
increase  in  market  value  given  one  additional  unit  of  capital  (note  that t t I K ≡ ∆ ) 
relative the opportunity cost. This is the so-called marginal q. Marginal q measures 
the return on investment, i, relative to the cost of capital, r, (qm = i/r). For investment 
to be efficient, I*, qm should be equal to one. If qm < 1 firms are over-investing, and 
conversely if qm > 1 firms are under-investing. 
In the neoclassical Q-theory of investment marginal q and Tobin’s average Q 
will equate. In equilibrium qm = Qa = 1. Hayashi (1982) show that this is the case only 
if firms are price takers (perfect competition), and their production and installation 
functions  are  homogeneous.  These  are  clearly  strong  assumptions.  Since  this  is 
typically not the case, marginal q should be used instead of Tobin’s Q. However, due 
to the difficulties in measuring marginal q, most studies use market-to-book measures 
of Tobin’s Q as a proxy for investment opportunities. In addition to the conventional 
market-to-book measure of Tobin’s Q, this paper also uses a measure of marginal q 
developed by Mueller and Reardon (1993), (see next section).  
As  mentioned,  in  a  frictionless  milieu  investment  should  only  depend  on 
Tobin’s Q. However, in the presence of capital market imperfections we no longer 
expect investments to be independent from liquidity (retentions). To test this, Fazzari 
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where REt is retentions in period t. A positive c in equation (2) rejects the frictionless 
model and implies either financial constraints or managerial discretion in the form of 
over-investment. Deviations from marginally efficient investments are caused by two 
principle  factors:  agency  problems  (managerial  discretion)  and  asymmetric   6 
information  (financial  hierarchy).  Agency  problems  may  cause  over-investment, 
whereas asymmetric information may result in under-investment.  
 
2.1  Asymmetric information  
 
From Akerlof (1970) we know that if outsiders are unable to distinguish between 
“good” products and “lemons” the average price will drop. In the context of financial 
markets information asymmetries will affect investment by raising the cost of external 
capital
3. As firms are investing, retained earnings are gradually depleted, and at some 
point it becomes necessary to resort to external funding of some sort in order to invest 
further. Asymmetric information, however, gives rise to a “financial hierarchy” where 
the cost of external funds is higher than internal funds. Myers and Majluf (1984) and 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that information asymmetries between managers and 
investors make external capital more expensive than internal finance. Informational 
asymmetries may, through increasing the cost of debt and equity, lead to suboptimal 
investment (I < I*). At this point qm > 1 (see Figure 2 in Appendix 1).  Baumol et al. 
(1970) and Mueller and Reardon (1993) have, for example, found that investments are 
sensitive  to  the  source  of  finance,  and  that  there  is  a  financial  hierarchy,  where 
internally generated cash flow is invested at a lower return than other external sources 
of  finance.  For  this  reason  under-investing  firms  are  expected  to  have  a  positive 
relationship between investments and retentions.  
In addition to this, firms with relatively good investment opportunities should 
also find it simpler to signal this to investors and therefore also find it easier to raise 
money. All else equal, one should therefore expect firms that have a high Tobin’s Q to 
find it less difficult to access external capital and thus depend less on retentions. To 
test this hypothesis an interaction term between Tobin’s Q and retentions is added. 
The expected sign of this term is negative, (Gugler et al., 2004).    
Since qm is a measure of investment efficiency we should expect qm to vary 
positively with under-investment.  
 
                                                 
3 In the absence of information asymmetries, transaction costs may still make external funds more 
costly than internally generated funds. See Duesenberry (1958).    7 
2.2  Managerial discretion  
 
The separation of ownership from control in corporations creates a principal-agent 
problem between the owners/investors on the one hand, and managers on the other. In 
modern corporations the owners and managers are often different and it can therefore 
also  be  assumed  that  they  frequently  have  conflicting  interests.  Berle  and  Means 
(1932)  argued  that  ownership  was  becoming  increasingly  dispersed  and  that  this 
would lead to more and more control being handed over to managers. Jensen and 
Meckling  (1976)  analyze  how  the  interests  of  managers  and  owners  diverge  as 
ownership  is  separated  from  control  and  ownership  becomes  dispersed.  With 
dispersion of ownership and divergence of interest there is a risk that managers cater 
to other objectives than shareholder value maximization
4. 
Gugler  et  al.  (2004)  argue  that,  even  though  the  managerial  discretion 
hypothesis suggests that over-investing firms rely on retentions to a high extent, this 
does not rule out the possibility that external funds also are used. By this logic, Gugler 
et  al.  argue  that  the  probability  of  managers  resorting  to  external  sources  should 
positively vary with Tobin’s Q. To test this hypothesis an interaction term between 
retentions and Tobin’s Q is included. The predicted sign is positive. 
Among  over-investing  firms  some  will  be  less  resource  wasting.  All  else 
equal, this will be reflected by a relatively higher marginal q. Marginal q is included 




2.3  Previous research and alternative explanation 
 
                                                 
4 A number of hypotheses have been suggested as to what managers are maximizing if not profits. 
Marris (1963) argue that managers are deriving utility from managing large firms and therefore tend to 
maximize  growth  rather  than  shareholder  value.  Baumol  (1959)  suggest  that  managers  are  instead 
maximizing sales. Assuming that managers (owner-managers) are pursuing growth instead of profit or 
shareholder maximization we can expect over-investment. Grabowski and Mueller (1972) suggest that 
the  sensitivity  of  investments  to  retentions/free  cash  flow  may  be  due  to  this  type  of  managerial 
discretion.  
   8 
The bulk of studies on investment behavior, going back to Kuh and Meyer (1957), 
find  that  investments  are  correlated  with  internal  funds  (both  free  cash  flow  and 
retentions). For reviews of the investment literature, see Chirinko (1993), Hubbard 
(1998), Jorgenson (1971).  
Fazzari, et al. (1988) show in their seminal study that investments in firms 
with high dividend ratios, and therefore less likely to suffer from financial constraints, 
are less sensitive to cash flow. These results have been corroborated by a number of 
studies. See for example Schaller (1993) on Canada and Hoshi et al. (1991) on Japan.  
Moreover,  institutional  differences  appear  to  be  important  in  determining 
cross-country differences in the sensitivity of investments to liquidity. In particular, 
there may be differences in tax policies that explain, at least partially, cross-country 
variations  in  investment  sensitivities.  Previous  studies  of  the  investment-liquidity 
relationship have found that the institutional context is of importance. Hoshi et al. 
(1991),  for  example,  find  that  the  corporate  structure  matters  for  how  sensitive 
investments in Japanese firms are to cash flow. Independent Japanese firms are more 
sensitive to liquidity than firms that are part of a group. In Scandinavia, one can also 
expect  the  tax  system  to  influence  investment  behavior.  Dividend  taxes  may,  for 
example, alter investment behavior so that internal funds are less costly than external 
capital  (Sinn,  1991).  Some  authors  claim  that  the  Swedish  tax  system  has 
systematically disfavored dividends over investment, which has caused managers to 
use  large  sums  of  internal  funds  for  investment  without  the  scrutiny  of  external 
investors or capital markets, (see Henrekson and Jakobsson (2001), Henrekson and 
Sanandaji (2004), Högfeldt (2004), and Magnusson and Jakobsson (2006) for more 
details  on  the  institutional  and  political  factors  that  have  influenced  the  Swedish 
corporate  governance  system).  Presumably,  this  is  also  the  case  in  the  other 
Scandinavian countries
5.     
A problem in these types of studies is the possibility that Tobin’s Q fails to 
perfectly control for investment opportunities, e.g. due to measurement errors. For 
                                                 
5 The industry and tax policies in Sweden were strongly influenced by the “socialistic” visions in the 
first half of the 20
th century that predicted that firms would become bigger and bigger (large scale) and 
eventually capitalism  would  be replaced by socialism. Schumpeter (1942) predicted in Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy, that socialism, due to the superior performance of capitalism, would replace 
capitalism in western democracies. Similar ideas are found in Galbraith’s (1967) The New Industrial 
State. For an analysis of how the Swedish industrial and tax polices were influenced by these ideas, see 
Henrekson and Jakobsson (2001) and Högfeldt (2004).      9 
example,  if  there  is  a  positive  serial  correlation  of  profits,  profits  will  reflect 
reinvestment opportunities and retentions in period t will be correlated with profits in 
period  t-1  (Tirole,  2006).  If  this  is  the  case,  profit  retentions  may  be  a  proxy  of 
investment opportunities, which then can explain why investments are sensitive to 
retentions. One way of controlling for this possibility is to include growth in sales. 
From accelerator theories of investments we know that growth in sales (proxies for 
changes in the desired output) is strongly correlated with changes in the desired level 
of capital (
*
t K ∆ ) (see Jorgenson, 1971).  
In neoclassical Q-theory of investment growth in sales is expected to have an 
impact since under neoclassical assumptions Tobin’s Q incorporates the accelerator 
model  (see  Ciccolo  and  Fromm,  1979,  Jorgenson  and  Sibert,  1968,  and  Mueller, 
2003).  
Growth in sales is also predicted to have a positive effect in both the under- 
and the over-investing group. Financially constrained firms are likely to find it less 
difficult  to  raise  external  funds  if  their  sales  are  increasing.  Firms  that  are  over-
investing should by the same logic find it easier to raise external capital if they have 
rapid sales growth.  
Table  1  summarizes  the  hypotheses  that  are  tested.  Since  both  the  agency 
hypothesis and the financial friction hypothesis predict a positive relationship between 
investments and liquidity it is difficult to differentiate between them. As mentioned, 
the  solution  is  to  identify  firms  that  are  under-  or  over-investing.  Managerial 
discretion (which implies excessive spending) is inconsistent with under-investments. 
Similarly, financial constraint explanation is inconsistent with over-investment. The 
hypotheses in Table 1 follow Gugler et al. (2004), with the exception that growth in 
sales has been added and the prediction of qm differs.  Gugler et al. do not include qm 
in the first column, and they make no predictions for the over-investing firms.     
To test the robustness of the results, Tobin’s average Q and dividend ratios are 




   10 
Table 1  Summary of hypotheses and predicted signs  
Marginal q theory of investment  Investment theory   
Neoclassical 








  All firms  Firms with 1 > m q   Firms with 1 < m q  
Dependent variable  It/Kt-1  It/Kt-1  It/Kt-1 
 
Explanatory variables: 
     
Intercept  +  +  + 
Retained Earnings, REt  0  +  + 
Tobin’s average Q, Qa,t-1  +  +  + 
Marginal q, qm,t-1  0  +  - 
Growth in Salest   0  +  + 
Qa,t-1 *REt  0  -  + 
 
 
3  Methodology and data 
 
Mueller and Reardon’s (1993) method to estimate qm links investment, It, to changes 
in market value, Mt. The intuition behind their method is that $1 worth of investment 
should be reflected by at least $1 increase in market value. This is the case if qm is 
equal to one, implying that the return on investment, i, is equal to the cost of capital, r, 
(qm = i/r). If qm > 1 this means that the return is above the cost of capital. This in turn 
means that further investment is profitable. Conversely, if qm  < 1  firms are over-
investing at returns below their cost of capital (see Appendix 2). 
Mueller and Reardon’s method can be used to calculate three different, but 
closely related, measures of marginal q. The first alternative is to calculate a firm and 
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where δ is the depreciation rate. The second alternative is to calculate a firm specific 
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Equation  (3)  is  used  to  calculate  the  qm,t  that  enters  the  investment  equation  as 
explanatory variable. µt is the error in market valuation of the firm in period t. The last 
term in (4) approaches zero as n grows.  m q is used to split the sample into over- and  
under-investing firms. To estimate qm, according to both equation (3) and (4), it is 
necessary to assume a depreciation rate (δ). For this purpose, the third alternative can 
be used as no assumptions regarding the depreciation rate are necessary. This method 



















δ                                   (5) 
 
This is an equation that can be empirically estimated. It should be noted that it is not 
necessary to calculate the cost of capital with this method.  From the efficient market 
hypothesis  we  expect  0 = + j t µ   for  all  j.  This  means  that  when  the  number  of 
observations grows, the last term in (5) will become smaller and approach 0. If the 
market fails to assign a correct market value in period t, equation (3) will give an 
incorrect estimate of qm. However, assuming that the errors in market valuation are 
not  persistent  and  that  possible  errors  are  corrected  by  the  market  in  subsequent 
periods equations (4) and (5) will still be accurate measures of qm, (see Gugler et al., 
2004,  and  also  Mueller  and  Reardon,  1993,  for  further  details  on  qm).  Since 
depreciation  rates  can  be  assumed  to  differ  across  industries,  industry  specific 
depreciation rates, δi are estimated. Industries are also subjected to random shocks 
that affect the value. For this reason equation (5) is also estimated with time effects. 
First, equation (5) is estimated. Then the estimated δi’s, including time effects, are   12 
plugged  into  equations  (3)  and  (4).  Equation  (3)  is  used  to  calculate  explanatory 
variable for the regression analysis and Equation (4) is used to split the sample into 
over-  and  under-investing  firms.  See  Appendix  2  for  a  derivation  of  these  three 
measures, and how they are linked to Tobin’s Q. 
Tobin’s Q is measured as the quotient between market value and capital (Qa,t = 
Mt/Kt).  
 
3.1  Variables and data 
 
The accounting and market price data have been obtained from Standard and Poor’s 
database  Compustat  Global  (mnemonic  items  in  brackets).  Market  value,  Mt,  is 
defined as the number of common shares times the market price per share (Mkval), 
plus total debt (Dt). Since the Mt is comprehensive, it is necessary to use an equally 
comprehensive definition of investment. Investment, It, is therefore measured as:  
 
  I = After tax profits – Dividends + Depreciation + ∆E + ∆D + Advertising costs + R&D  
 
where after tax profit is income before extraordinary items (Ib), dividends (DVT), 
depreciation (DVC), ∆E is new equity (SSTK – PRSTKC), ∆D is change in debt (DT), 
R&D is research and development expenditures (XRD) and Adv. is marketing and 
advertising  expenditures  (approximated  with  XSGA)
6.  Retained  Earnings,  REt,  is 
defined as the sum of the first three variables in the investment function (after tax 
profit, dividends and depreciation). Capital, Kt, is defined as total assets (AT). As sales 
variable (SALE) is used.  
Marginal q, qm,t, and weighted average of marginal q, m q , are calculated from 
equation  (6)  and  (7),  respectively.  Tobin’s  Q,  Qa,t,  is  calculated  as  the  quotient 
between Mt and Kt. All variables are adjusted to 2005 constant prices (Eurostat HCPI, 
2005 = 100).  In total, data for 292 listed Scandinavian firms have been collected 
(2004 observations). The data rages from 1998 or 1999 to 2005 and is unbalanced.    
                                                 
6 This definition allows for investments to be negative if losses of a firm are large enough. The reason 
that investment can be negative is that the accounting depreciation data fails to capture actual economic 
depreciation of capital. Negative investments make no sense in equations 3 and 4 and have therefore 
been excluded. The results  in the remainder of the paper are robust if  negative  “investments” are 
excluded or not. Only few investment observations are negative.            13 
 
 
4  Results and analysis  
 
The basic investment equation that is estimated is an extended version of equation (2) 
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In addition to retained  earnings, REt, and Tobin’s average Q, Qa, marginal q, qm, 
Tobin’s Q interacted with retentions, 1 − × t a t Q RE , , and growth in sales are added. Both 
marginal q and Tobin’s Q are lagged one period to avoid endogeneity problems. An 
alternative to REt is to use a pre-dividend definition of liquidity, free cash flow. Using 
free  cash  flow  instead  of  retained  earnings  is,  however,  inconsequential  from  an 
empirical  point  of  view,  considering  that  the  correlation  is  close  to  one  (see 
correlation  matrix  in  Appendix  3).  The  results  in  this  paper  hold  also  for  this 
definition of liquidity.    
Ideally, dividing It and REt with Kt-1 should normalize equation (6) and make it 
empirically testable. However, none of the variables are normally distributed; both 
skewness and kurtosis are high for all the variables in equation (6). Jarque-Bera and 
Shapiro-Wilk tests indicate significant non-normality at one percent level for all the 
variables.  
There  are  several  ways  of  dealing  with  non-normality;  transformation  of 
variables, trimming of the sample, or some sort of robust estimation technique. Which 
method is more appropriate depends on the cause of non-normality. From histograms 
of the variables it is clear that extreme values are the problem. Therefore, as a first 
step to reduce the weight of outliers, all the variables have been caped at the 1
st and 
99
th percentiles. This makes the variables more normally  distributed and makes it 
possible to use standard OLS estimations.  
To trim the sample in this way is, however, unsatisfactory. A more appropriate way of 
dealing with non-normality is to employ some sort of a robust estimation technique.   14 
The standard technique is to use quintile median regressions. Median regressions can, 
however, be more sensitive to outliers than Iteratively Reweighed Least Squares. The 
Iteratively Reweighed Least Squares use a maximum likelihood estimator where case 
weights are calculated from scaled residuals. Median absolute deviation is used as 
scale, see Huber (1981). 
As  a  robustness  check  all  three  types  of  estimation  are  used  and  reported 
(trimmed  OLS,  Iteratively  Reweighed  Least  Squares  and  Median  Regression). 
Iteratively Reweighed Least Squares, which is the theoretically most appropriate way 
of  dealing  with  non-normality,  also  yield  the  best  results  in  terms  of  explanatory 
power.  Otherwise  the  results  are  robust  with  respect  to  the  choice  of  estimation 
method.  
Other statistical problems, such as multicollinarity for example, do not seem to 
plague the data (see correlation matrix). The correlation between Qa,t and growth in 
sales for example is only 0.17, which must be considered low given that both are 
indicators of investment opportunities. Qa,t and qm,t is only weakly correlated (0.14). 
Surprisingly, there is no correlation between qm,t  and It. The strongest correlation is 
found between REt and It (0.38). As Qa,t, qm,t and growth in sales all are measures of 
investment  opportunities  one  might  still  be  concerned  about  multicollinarity. 
Therefore, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) has also been calculated. No VIF is 
above two, which indicates that there is no significant problem with multicollinarity.   
Since it is a panel data set, all regressions are estimated with industry and time 
effects (fixed effect). The time effects control for possible cyclicity of investments 
and  the  industry  effects  control  for  differences  in  investment  behavior  across 
industries. All results are robust with regard to the inclusion or omission of time, 
industry  and  country  effects.  Regressions  reported  here  have  been  estimated  with 
industry (2-digit SIC) and time effects (not reported). In addition, possible country 
effects  have  been  tested  for.  Sweden  is  found  to  have  a  significantly  higher 
investment rate than the other Scandinavian countries, but country effects do not alter 
the results and consequently they have been excluded.  
Retained earnings are clearly the most important variable and the estimated 
coefficient is not significantly different from one. These coefficients are also in the 
upper end of the distribution of coefficients found in this type of studies.    15 
Independent of investment opportunities, Scandinavian firms rely to a very 
large  extent  on  retentions  to  fund  their  investments.  Both  firms  that  are  in  the 
financially constrained category and firms that are in the category of over-investing 
display  almost  a  strict  proportionality  between  retentions  and  investments.  The 
frictionless hypothesis is clearly rejected.   
Using the same methodology and variables definitions, Gugler et al. (2004) 
find the coefficient for US to be 0.20. For financially constrained firms their estimates 
are a bit higher, 0.30, and for over-investing ones the coefficient is 0.15.  Fazzari et 
al.’s (1988) study of US firms also finds most coefficients on cash flow to lie in the 
rage 0.20 to 0.40.  
Still, there are significant differences across firms. Looking at the aggregate 
investments, retentions account for not more than about 50 percent of all investments. 
The reason is that the majority of firms rely on retentions whereas only few firms 
raise most of the new equity (∆E). Only 9 percent of the firms raised new equity 
during the period, and even among these firms the equity additions were skewed. Ten 
firms accounted for more than 50 percent of all new equity additions. The majority of 
firms rely to a high extent, or solely, on retentions to fund their investments.   
Assuming that profits are serially correlated, profit retentions may simply be a 
proxy for investment opportunities. To control for this possibility growth in sales is 
also included.
7  
Results for all firms are reported in Table 2. Growth in sales is found to vary 
positively with investment. Tobin’s Q is also positively related to investments, while 
marginal q has no robust significant impact on investment. One explanation could be 
that Qa,t controls for investment opportunities and thereby renders qm,t  insignificant. 
However  qm,t  remains  insignificant  even  after  omitting  Qa,t.  An  alternative 
interpretation  can  therefore  be  that  qm  fails  as  a  forward  looking  measure  of 
investment opportunities. Both Tobin’s Q and growth in sales have a relatively low 
economic significance. 
                                                 
7  In  empirical  applications  of  the  accelerator  model  of  investment,  accelerator  sales  models  yield 
superior predictions as compared to value added and profit accelerators, see Jorgenson (1971).    16 
The  constant  (replacement  investment  coefficient)  is  roughly  in  the 
neighborhood  of  15  percent,  meaning  that  replacement  investment  amount  to 
approximately 15 percent of Kt-1, which seems plausible.  
 
Table 2  All firms  
 
Dependent variable: It/Kt-1 
  Fixed Effects 




Quintile  Median 
Regression 









































       
No. observations  1836  2002  2003 
No. firms  292  292  292 
R
2  0.38  0.96  - 
Pseudo R
2  -  -  0.32 
F-value  19.9  861.3  - 
a Trimmed sample, *** indicates significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent and * at 10 percent level. t-
values in brackets.   
 
The next step is to split the data into two groups; firms with  m q > 1 (under-investing) 
and firms with  m q < 1 (over-investing).  m q are calculated using equation (4). The  m q ’s 
are estimates of the weighted average return on investments relative to the cost of 
capital for each firm. Equations (3) (qm,t) and (4) ( m q ) are both sensitive to the choice 
of  depreciation  rates.  To  obtain  accurate  depreciation  rates  equation  (5)  was  first 
estimated  including  both  time  and  industry  specific  effects,  from  which  time  and 
industry specific depreciation rates were obtained. For more details on the estimation 
of  marginal q,  see  Mueller  and  Reardon  (1993),  Gugler  et  al.  (2004)  and  Eklund 
(2008). The results for  these under-investing firms are reported in Table 3. Over-
investing firms are reported in Table 4.  
   17 
Table 3  Under-investing firms with marginal q > 1  
 
Dependent variable: It/Kt-1 
  Fixed Effects 




Quintile  Median 
Regression 









































       
No. observations  637  727  729 
No. firms  106  106  106 
R
2  0.48  0.77  - 
Pseudo R
2  -  -  0.24 
F-value  12.95  54.2  - 
a Trimmed sample, *** indicates significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent and * at 10 percent level. t-
values in brackets.   
 
The effect of REt on investments remains close to one in both groups of firms. In most 
of  the  regressions  marginal  q  turns  out  to  be  insignificant.  In  economic  terms, 
retentions are clearly the most important variable that explains most of the variation. 
As predicted, information asymmetries  and financial constraints appear to become 
less  problematic  for  firms  with  high  Qa,t’s.  This  can  be  seen  from  the  negative 
coefficient on Qa,t-1* REt. The same term is negative, but not robustly so, among over-
investing  firms.  The  hypothesis  that  over-investing  firms  are  resorting  to  more 
external finance when Qa,t is high is therefore rejected.  
An  interesting  observation  is  that  over-investing  firms  appear  to  be  more 
sensitive to changes in Tobin’s Q and growth in sales than financially constrained 
firms. One straightforward interpretation is that financially constrained firms simply 
cannot increase their investments in response to hikes in investment opportunities.  
The results in Table 3 and 4 have been subjected to a number of robustness 
tests.  First,  firms  having  m q ’s  close  to  one  were  excluded  (0.8  <  m q   <  1.2).  By 
excluding these firms a clearer separation between over- and under-investing forms is 
achieved. Secondly, the results in Table 3 and 4 were replicated using a different   18 
calculation of qm,t and  m q assuming a 10 percent depreciation rate across all firms and 
industries. The results remain robust in both these cases (Not reported).  
 
Table 4  Over-investing firms with marginal q < 1 
 
Dependent variable: It/Kt-1 
  Fixed Effects 




Quintile  Median 
Regression 
Constant     0.161*** 
 (3.19) 
 
  0.094 
 (1.24) 
  0.227*** 
 (5.83) 
REt/Kt-1    1.341*** 
 (12.63) 
 
  1.014*** 
 (110.31) 
  1.020*** 
 (115.83) 
Tobin’s Q, Qa,t-1    0.092*** 
 (9.76) 
 
  0.060*** 
 (22.31) 
  0.028*** 
 (11.00) 
Marginal q, qm,t-1  - 0.000 





 (- 4.48) 
∆Salest/salest-1    0.137*** 
 (5.86) 
 
  0.117*** 
 (9.68) 
  0.138*** 
 (12.12) 
Qa,t-1* REt  - 0.325*** 




 (- 1.65) 
       
No. observations  1199  1274  1274 
No. firms  186  186  186 
R
2  0.41  0.97  - 
Pseudo R
2  -  -  0.39 
F-value  15.3  783.8  - 
a Trimmed sample, *** indicates significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent and * at 10 percent level. t-
values in brackets.   
 
As a further robustness check, Tobin’s Q,  a Q (period average), was used in the same 
way as marginal q,  m q , to distinguish between over- and under-investing firms. The 
results are robust as compared to the grouping based on marginal q. The results are 
reported in Appendix 4. Finally, the sample was also split into high and low dividend 
firms. Fazzari et al. (1988), for example, find that low dividend firms tend to be more 
sensitive to retentions. Dividend ratios were calculated as the dividends over free cash 
flow. These results are also reported in Appendix 4. Again, the results are robust and 
the retention coefficients are close to one.  
In  contrast  to  Gugler  et  al.  (2004),  few  of  the  coefficients  on  qm,t  are 
significant.  Gugler et al. find coefficients in the range of 0.002 and 0.005. Thus, from 
an economic point of view marginal q, as measured here, has a negligible impact. A 
possible explanation for this is the fact that the methodology of measuring marginal q   19 
does not yield a forward looking measure of future investment opportunities. It is 
forward looking in the sense that an investment made in period t is reflected in the 
market  value,  which  is  based  on  market  expectations.  But  marginal  q  does  not 
necessarily yield a good prediction of future investment opportunities. Mueller and 
Reardon’s (1993) measure of marginal q may, in other words, be an appropriate ex 
post measure of performance but less adequate as an ex ante indicator of investment 
opportunities.  
These  investment-retention  coefficients  are  very  large  when  compared 
internationally. There are several alternative explanations that possibly can explain the 
strong  effect  retentions  have  on  investments.  First,  in  this  sample  only  listed 
Scandinavian firms are included, which may cause a selection bias. Assuming that the 
majority of the firms are mature and have depleted their investment opportunities in 
the sense that they no longer require large external funding for their investments, this 
could  probably  shed  some  light  on  the  results  (see  lifecycle  theories  of  the  firm, 
Mueller, 1972).    
Second, the age of firms is possibly also a factor that matters for how sensitive 
investments are to retentions. One hypothesis is that information asymmetries that 
constrain  firms  financially  are  gradually  reduced  as  firms  matures  and  build  a 
reputation. If this is the case internal funds should become less important over the life-
cycle of the firm. Examining Canadian firms, Schaller (1993) finds that young firms 
are more cash flow sensitive. However, this seems unlikely, considering that all firms 
independent of investments opportunities are sensitive to retentions.  
A counter hypothesis is that as a firm matures investment opportunities are 
depleted. When this happens managers may find it more difficult to access external 
capital thereby resorting extensively to internally generated funds, see the life-cycle 
theory of the firm in Grabowski and Mueller (1975). 
Finally,  there  may  be  strong  institutional  factors  such  as  tax  policy  (Sinn, 
1991) favoring retentions over other sources of finance. All in all, institutional factors 
are likely to be the cause of the high dependence on retentions. Transaction costs of 
various sorts, as pointed out by Duesenberry (1958), can make investments sensitive 
to retentions. To what extent tax policies and various market regulations (i.e. labor   20 
market  rigidities)  contribute  to  these  frictions  is  an  area  where  more  research  is 
needed.  
Apart  from  financial  frictions,  in  terms  of  information  asymmetries  and 
agency  problems,  the  results  also  have  macro  economic  implications.  Financial 
market imperfections can, for example, lead to “financial accelerators”, which may 
magnify initial economic shocks, see Bernanke et al. (1996) and also Fisher (1933). 
This implies that a large coefficient on retentions/cash flow can augment business 
cycles. Firms relying solely on internal funds will reduce their investments when their 
revenues/profits falls which then acts magnifying. Vice versa, when profits are high 
investments will also be high. Empirical studies by Greenwald et al. (1984), Bernanke 
and Gertler (1989) and Hoshi et al. (1991) find evidence that these types of capital 
market frictions contribute to fluctuations in output.   
 
 
5  Conclusions 
 
Using  comprehensive  definitions  of  investment  and  retained  earnings,  this  paper 
shows that Scandinavian firms are highly dependent on retained earnings to fund their 
investments. Independent of investment opportunities Scandinavian firms rely heavily 
on retained earnings. Both firms that are financially constrained and firms that are 
over-investing rely largely on retentions to fund their investments. Investments are 
almost strictly proportional to retentions.  
A positive relationship between investment and internally generated funds can 
in principle be explained by either information asymmetries (Myers and Majluf, 1984) 
or managerial discretion (Grabowski and Mueller, 1972). In order to separate between 
these two alternative explanations it is necessary to distinguish between firms that are 
under- and over-investing, respectively. In this paper a method to measure marginal q 
developed by Mueller and Reardon (1993) is used to differentiate between these two 
categories of firms. The results are also robust when controlling for high and low 
dividend firms, and firms with high or low Tobin’s Q.     
It  is  hard  to  accept  that  the  two  alternative  hypotheses,  asymmetric 
information and managerial discretion, can explain the results, given the exceptionally   21 
strong effect of retentions on investments. Instead, further studies are called upon to 
explore the institutional specificities of Scandinavian corporate governance systems. 
The question that arises is related to the cause of the frictions that make firms so 
dependent on retentions. The tax system may be one factor obstructing an efficient 
capital allocation. Another possible explanation for this high dependence on retentions 
may be found in the roots of the corporate governance systems, which, for a long 
time, have favored large growing enterprises at the expense of smaller new firms. This 
tendency has arguably been particularly strong in Sweden (Högfeldt, 2004), which is 
also found to have the highest investment rate in Scandinavia.   
How investment behavior is affected by control structures, such as pyramids 
and dual-class shares, and how these interact with ownership may, for example, be 
important,  particularly  the  question  of  the  extent  that  control  structures  mitigate 
problems with asymmetric information and agency problems or makes them more 
severe.  Further  research  on  how  relations  to  banks  and  ownership  spheres  affect 
investment behavior is also necessary.   
Finally,  this  paper  raises  two  important  policy  concerns  that  call  for  more 
research. First, the extent tax policies/industry policies can explain these results. If tax 
policies, for instance, favor retentions over dividends, one needs to understand the 
implications  for  business  renewal  and  structural  change.  Assuming  that  some 
Scandinavian firms are suffering from financial constraints, while at the same time, 
other firms are over-investing, this implies that capital is allocated inefficiently. A 
policy change that reduces dependence on retentions to fund investments would then 
improve  resource  allocation,  bringing  about  a  swifter  reallocation  of  resources 
between  different  sectors  of  the  economy.  Secondly,  if  the  investment-liquidity 
relationship  is  robust  over  time,  one  needs  to  investigate  the  extent  to  which  it 
contributes  to  excessive  business  and  output  fluctuations.  All  else  equal,  high 
dependence on retentions means that investments will co-move with business cycles 
to a higher extent. These aspects call for further research.      22 
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Appendix 1    
 
Figure 1  Managerial discretion and over-investment 
 
Figure 2  Investments and asymmetric information  
 
mrrk ≡ i 
I* 










mrrk ≡ i 
I*  RE (free cash flow)  Investmets (I) 
mrrk,≡ i,r 
r   28 
Appendix 2    Tobin’s average Q and marginal q 
 
Mueller and Reardon’s (1993) method of measuring marginal q can be derived from 
Tobin’s  Q.  Tobin’s  Q  is  defined  as  the  ratio  between  the  market  value  and  the 
replacement cost of capital. Tobin’s Q measures the average return on capital, K, 
(hence average Q) whereas marginal q measures the marginal return r, of new capital 
(I).  Both  these  measures  can  be  derived  from  the  rule  of  marginal  efficiency  of 
investment. Note that in a competitive equilibrium where all firms are price takers 
Tobin’s Q and marginal q will both be equal to one (Hayashi, 1982).    
At time t, the market value, Mt, of a firm can be defined as the present value of 
future cash flows. An investment, It, made in period t, will generate future cash flows, 









                                   (7) 
 
where r is the discount rate. For investment to be rational from a shareholder-value 
maximization perspective,  only  investments  that  have  a positive  net present  value 
should be considered (PVt – It > 0).  
The market value of a firm at time t can, in other words, be expressed as the 
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t t K I K δ                                    (9) 
 
Tobin’s average q is the quotient between equations (8) and (9) (Qa,t = Mt/Kt).  
                                                 
8 Investments are typically thought of as generating a finite number of future cash flows. A firm can, on 
the other hand, be assumed to generate infinitely many future projects.      29 
The marginal return on new capital or marginal q, qm, can be derived from the 
net present value rule. qm is the quotient between i and r, where i is a quasi-permanent 








PV , = =                                                   (10) 
 
The market value at time t can be  expressed  as the market value in  the previous 
period, plus the present value of investment made in period t, minus the depreciation, 
δ , of Mt-1:  
 
t t t t t M PV M M µ δ + − + = − − 1 1                                                 (11) 
 
µ  is  the  error  that  the  market  may  make  in  evaluating  the  firm  in  period  t.  By 
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Taking equation (11) and replacing the second term with subsequent periods yields a 
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Thus, equation (4) is the multi-period weighted average of equation (3).  
By  rearranging  equation  (3)  and  dividing  with  Mt-1  to  remove 





















δ                               (5’) 
 
Equation  (5)  can  be  empirically  estimated.  Since  depreciation  rates  differ  across 
industries, industry specific depreciation rates, δi are estimated. Industries are also 
subjected to random shocks that affect the value. For this reason equation (9) is also 
estimated  with  specific  time  shocks.  First,  equation  (5)  is  estimated  and  then  the 
estimates of δi, including time effects, are plugged into equations (3) and (4). From 
the efficient market hypothesis we expect 0 = + j t µ , for all j. This means that when the 
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Table 6  Descriptive statistics 
a 
Variables   Mean   Median  Std. dev.   Skewness  Kurtosis 
∆Salest/salest-1  0.079  0.039  0.32  3.55  26.76 
Tobin’s Q, Qa, t-1  1.277  0.891  1.19  3.34  16.67 
Marginal q, qm,t-1  5.971  4.209  28.08  - 0.72  26.71 
Average marginal q,  1 , − t m q   1.378  0.744  6.16  11.65  166.26 
It/Kt-1  0.225  0.164  0.28  1.14  5.13 
REt/Kt-1  0.061  0.073  0.12  - 1.60  10.08 
Qa,t-1* REt/Kt-1  - 0.957  0.059  41.98  - 44.31  1975.92 
Dividend ratio  0.282  0.198  0.40  2.14  12.14 
ª based on the trimmed sample Q-theory of Investments and Earnings Retentions 
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Appendix 4    Robustness checks  
 
In Tables 7 and 8 the sample has been divided into firms with Tobin’s Q above and below 
one. Tobin’s Q is the period average for each firm.   
 
Table 7  Under-investing firms with Tobin’s average Q > 1 
 
Dependent variable: It/Kt-1 
  Fixed Effects 
a  Iteratively 
Reweighed 
Least Squares 
Quintile  Median 
Regression 









































       
No. observations  854  958  959 
No. firms  140  140  140 
R
2  0.41  0.98  - 
Pseudo R
2  -  -  0.41 
F-value  12.22  951.54  - 
a Trimmed sample, *** indicates significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent and * at 10 percent level. t-values in 
brackets.   
 Q-theory of Investments and Earnings Retentions 
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Table 8  Over-investing firms with Tobin’s average Q < 1  
 
Dependent variable: It/Kt-1 
  Fixed Effects 




Quintile  Median 
Regression 









































       
No. observations  982  1042  1044 
No. firms  152  152  152 
R
2  0.39  0.50  - 
Pseudo R
2  -  -  0.25 
F-value  14.24  22.82  - 
a Trimmed sample, *** indicates significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent and * at 10 percent level. t-values in 
brackets.   
 
 Q-theory of Investments and Earnings Retentions 
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In Tables 9 and 10 the sample has been divided into low and high dividend payout ratio firms.  
 
Table 9  Low dividend firms 
 
Dependent variable: It/Kt-1 
  Fixed Effects 
a  Iteratively Reweighed 
Least Squares 
 
Quintile  Median 
Regression 









































       
No. observations  885  998  1000 
No. firms  147  147  147 
R
2  0.42  0.68  - 
Pseudo R
2  -  -  0.29 
F-value  12.6  42.4  - 
a Trimmed sample, *** indicates significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent and * at 10 percent level. t-values in 
brackets.   
 
 Q-theory of Investments and Earnings Retentions 
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Table 10  High dividend firms 
 
Dependent variable: It/Kt-1 
  Fixed Effects 
a  Iteratively Reweighed 
Least Squares 
 
Quintile  Median 
Regression 









































       
No. observations  951  1001  1003 
No. firms  145  145  145 
R
2  0.42  0.99  - 
Pseudo R
2  -  -  0.44 
F-value  13.6  1339.3  - 
a Trimmed sample, *** indicates significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent and * at 10 percent level. t-values in 
brackets.   
 